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Abstract
We present some complementary results to Bidian and Bejan (2012). Part
1 provides necessary and sufficient transversality conditions for an agent’s opti-
mization problem. They are extensions to stochastic environments of the con-
ditions given by Kocherlakota (1992), or alternatively, extensions to nonzero
debt constraints of the corresponding conditions in Forno and Montrucchio
(2003). Part 2 presents an elementary proof of the characterization of NTT
debt limits (Theorem 3.5 in the main paper) for the case when debt constraints
bind in bounded time, that requires no martingale techniques or boundedness
assumptions on the discounted debt limits. Part 3 complements results in Sec-
tion 5.1 (in the main paper), showing that all the equilibria that can sustain
bubbles under an interdiction to trade can be achieved from fixed, zero initial
wealth for the agents. Thus endogeneity of debt limits causes multiplicity of
not only asset prices (through bubbles), but also of real equilibrium allocations.
1 Transversality conditions
We analyze the problem Pt(aˆt, φ, p) of a consumer that faces debt bounds φ, pricing
kernel p and starts with wealth aˆt (Ft-measurable) at period t (see Section 3 in the
∗Corresponding author. Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, PO Box 4036,
Atlanta GA 30302-4036. E-mail: fbidian@gsu.edu
†Rice University, MS 22, PO Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251-1892. E-mail: camelia@rice.edu
1
main text). Let (c¯, a¯) ∈ Ct(aˆt, φ, p) be the optimal consumption (assumed positive)
and asset holdings for the agent. Familiar variational arguments show that (c¯, a¯)
satisfies the following Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions, for all s ≥ t:
u′s(c¯s)− u′s+1(c¯s+1)
ps
ps+1
≥ 0, (1.1)(
u′s(c¯s)− u′s+1(c¯s+1)
ps
ps+1
)
(a¯s+1 − φs+1) = 0. (1.2)
Let e¯s := es + φs − Es ps+1ps φs+1, for all s ≥ t. Adapting the arguments of Forno and
Montrucchio (2003), we obtain the following necessary transversality condition:1
Lemma 1.1 (Necessary transversality condition). The optimal path (c¯, a¯) satisfies
lim
t→∞
Etu
′
s(c¯s)(a¯s − φs) = 0. (1.3)
Proof. Fix an ε¯ > 0 a period s > t. Concavity implies that for any 0 < ε < ε¯ and
n ≥ t,
un(c¯n)− un(c¯n + ε(e¯n − c¯n)) ≤ ε
ε¯
(un(c¯n)− un(c¯n + ε¯(e¯n − c¯n))) .
We construct the alternative asset holdings process (an(ε))
∞
n=t where an(ε) = a¯n if t ≤
n ≤ s, and an(ε) = (1− ε)a¯n + εφn if n ≥ s+ 1. It sustains the feasible consumption
process (cn(ε))
∞
n=s defined by cn(ε) = c¯n if t ≤ n < s, cs(ε) = c¯s+Es ps+1ps (a¯s+1−φs+1),
and cn(ε) = c¯n + ε(e¯n − c¯n) for n > s. Optimality of c¯ implies that
0 ≤ Et (us(c¯s)− us(cs(ε))) + lim sup
T→∞
Et
T∑
n=s+1
(un(c¯n)− un(cn(ε))) . (1.4)
Notice that
T∑
n=s+1
1
ε
(un(c¯n)− un(cn(ε))) ≤
∞∑
n=s+1
1
ε¯
(un(c¯n)− un(cn(ε¯)))+ ,
1 The proof works for general period utilities ut(·), not necessarily of the discounted and bounded
variety assumed in the text, if one uses a weak optimality criterion (Forno and Montrucchio 2003)
and if there exists ε¯ > 0 such that E
∑∞
s=t (us(c¯s)− us(c¯s + ε¯(e¯s − c¯s)))+ <∞.
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and the term
∑∞
n=s+1
1
ε¯
(un(c¯n)− un(cn(ε¯)))+ is integrable, by hypothesis. Fatou’s
lemma gives
lim sup
T→∞
Et
T∑
n=s+1
1
ε
(un(c¯n)− un(cn(ε))) ≤ Et lim sup
T→∞
T∑
n=s+1
1
ε
(un(c¯n)− un(cn(ε)))
≤ Et
∞∑
n=s+1
1
ε¯
(un(c¯n)− un(cn(ε¯)))+ . (1.5)
Dividing both sides of (1.4) by ε and using (1.5),
−Et1
ε
(us(c¯s)− us(cs(ε))) ≤ Et
∞∑
n=s+1
1
ε¯
(un(c¯n)− un(cn(ε¯)))+ <∞.
By the monotone convergence theorem, when ε↘ 0, the left hand side of the above
equation converges to Etu
′
s(c¯s)
ps+1
ps
(a¯s+1 − φs+1), which equals Etu′s+1(c¯s+1)(a¯s+1 −
φs+1), due to the Kuhn-Tucker equations (1.1),(1.2). The conclusion follows by
letting s→∞.
We include for completeness the standard proof of sufficiency of the Kuhn-Tucker
and transversality conditions for the optimality of a path.
Lemma 1.2 (Sufficient transversality condition). If a feasible path (c¯, a¯) ∈ Bt(aˆt, φ, p)
satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (1.1) and (1.2), then for any other feasible path
(c, a) ∈ Bt(aˆt, φ, p) and any bounded stopping time T ≥ t,
Et
T∑
s=t
(us(cs)− us(c¯s)) ≤ Etu′T+1(c¯T+1)(a¯T+1 − φT+1). (1.6)
Thus a sufficient condition for (c¯, a¯) to be optimal for problem Pt(aˆt, φ, p) is
lim inf
s→∞
Etu
′
s(c¯s)(a¯s − φs) = 0, (1.7)
Proof. Let µs+1 := u
′
s(c¯s) − u′s+1(c¯s+1) psps+1 . Consider an arbitrary feasible path
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(c, a) ∈ Bt(aˆt, φ, p). Using concavity of us(·) and the budget constraints,
Et
T∑
s=t
(us(cs)− us(c¯s)) ≤ Et
T∑
s=t
u′s(c¯s)(cs − c¯s) =
= Et
T∑
s=t
u′s(c¯s)
(
as − φs − Esps+1
ps
(as+1 − φs+1)
)
−
−Et
T∑
s=t
u′s(c¯s)
(
a¯s − φs − Esps+1
ps
(a¯s+1 − φs+1)
)
.
We analyze separately the last two terms. Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
(1.1) and (1.2), which show that µs+1 ≥ 0 for all s ≥ t, it follows that
Et
T∑
s=t
u′s(c¯s)
(
(as − φs)− Esps+1
ps
(as+1 − φs+1)
)
= Et
T∑
s=t
(
u′s(c¯s)(as − φs)−
(
u′s+1(c¯s+1) +
ps+1
ps
µs+1
)
(as+1 − φs+1)
)
≤ u′t(c¯t)(at − φt)− Etu′T+1(c¯T+1)(aT+1 − φT+1) ≤ Etu′t(c¯t)(at − φt).
Similarly, using both (1.1) and (1.2),
Et
T∑
s=t
u′s(c¯s)
(
(as − φs)− Esps+1
ps
(as+1 − φs+1)
)
= u′t(c¯t)(a¯t − φt)− Etu′T+1(c¯T+1)(a¯T+1 − φT+1).
Moreover at = a¯t since they equal the initial period t wealth of the consumer, aˆt.
Thus
lim inf
T→∞
Et
T∑
s=t
(us(cs)− us(c¯s)) ≤ lim inf
T→∞
Etu
′
T+1(c¯T+1)(a¯T+1 − φT+1) = 0,
and therefore (c¯, a¯) is optimal for Pt(aˆt, φt, p).
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2 The case when debt limits bind in bounded time
We give an elementary proof of Theorem 3.5 (in the paper) that does not use results
from the theory of martingales, for the case when α(t) is bounded, for any t ∈ N.
Assumption 3.1 and Proposition 3.4 are not needed in this case. As in the paper,
continuation utilities after default are the same under the two debt limits φ, φ¯. We
assume that for any period t, there exists a natural number n(t) such that the bounds
φ bind before period n(t) along the optimal path for the problem Pt(φt, φ, p).
The process (Mˆs)
α(t)
s=t from STEP 1 can be simply chosen to be Mˆs = EsMα(t) (for
any stopping time s such that t ≤ s ≤ α(t)), and shown that Mˆ ≤ M by backward
induction. This proof is given in Proposition 2.1 below. Thus (3.12) (in the main
text) follows therefore directly from the construction of Mˆ . In STEP 2, (Mˆs)
∞
s=t is
obtained as before by letting Mˆs := EsMαk+1(t) for each k ≥ 1 natural and each finite
stopping time s such that αk(t) + 1 ≤ s ≤ αk+1(t). The optimal solution (c¯, a¯) to the
problem Pt(φt, φ, p) is also an optimal solution for the “relaxed” problem Pt(φt, φˆ, p)
(with φˆ = φ¯+ Mˆ/p ≤ φ), since for any feasible (c, a) ∈ Bt(φt, φˆ, p),
Ut(c)−Ut(c¯) = lim inf
k→∞
Et
αk(t)−1∑
s=t
(us(cs)−us(c¯s)) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
Etu
′
αk(t)(c¯αk(t))(a¯αk(t)−φˆαk(t)) = 0.
The inequality above follows from a¯αk(t) − φˆαk(t) = a¯αk(t) − φαk(t) = 0. An identical
argument shows that Mt = Mˆt, hence Mt = EtMα(t). STEP 3 is unchanged.
Proposition 2.1. Assume that φ are NTT. Let T ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω such that there
exists n ∈ N with the property that α(T ) ≤ T + n on FT (ω). Then
MT ≥ ETMα(T ) on FT (ω). (2.1)
Proof. We prove the Proposition by induction on n.
We show, first, that the claim in the Proposition is true for n = 1. When not
explicit, all equalities and inequalities that follow are understood to hold on F(ω).
Since T + 1 ≤ α(T ) ≤ T + n = T + 1, it follows that α(T ) = T + 1. Assume by
contradiction that MT < ETMT+1. Let (c, a) ∈ CT (φT , φ, p). As φ are binding at
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T + 1,
cT = eT + φT − ET pT+1
pT
φT+1 < eT + φ¯T − ET pT+1
pT
φ¯T+1 =: c¯T .
Let a¯T := φ¯T and t > T , choose c¯t, a¯t such that (c¯, a¯) ∈ BT+1(φ¯T+1, φ¯, p). It is
immediate to check that (c¯, a¯) ∈ BT (φ¯T , φ¯, p). We reached a contradiction, as the
continuation utility after T of path c¯ is less or equal to V dT and strictly dominates
the continuation utility after T over c, which equals V dT :
V dT (p) = VT (φT , φ, p) = UT (c) = uT (cT )+ETV
d
T+1 < uT (c¯T )+ETV
d
T+1 = UT (c¯) ≤ V dT .
Suppose now that the claim in the proposition is true for arbitrary T and ω such
that α(T ) ≤ T + n on FT (ω) for some n = 1, . . . , k. Choose T and ω such that
α(T ) ≤ T + k + 1 on FT (ω). We need to show that MT ≥ ETMα(T ) on FT (ω).
Assume, by contradiction, that MT < ETMα(T ).
For any t satisfying T+1 ≤ t ≤ α(T ), using the induction hypothesis and applying
the law of iterated expectations a finite number of times, we get Mt ≥ EtMα(T ). Let
(c, a) ∈ CT (φT , φ, p). Let a¯t := φ¯T and for t satisfying T + 1 ≤ t < α(T ), construct
a¯t := at − 1
pt
EtMα(T ) ≥ φt − 1
pt
EtMα(T ) = φ¯t +
1
pt
(Mt − EtMα(T )) ≥ φ¯t.
For t ≥ α(T ), let (c¯, a¯) ∈ Bα(T )(φ¯α(T ), φ¯, p). For t ∈ [T, α(T )), let
c¯t := et + a¯t − 1
pt
Etpt+1a¯t+1.
Notice that c¯t = ct for T < t < α(T ), and
c¯T = eT + φ¯T − 1
pT
ETpT+1a¯T+1 = cT − 1
pT
(MT − ETMα(T )) > cT .
Moreover, (c¯, a¯) ∈ BT (φ¯T , φ¯, p). It follows that the path c¯ dominates c in terms of
utility after T , and a contradiction is obtained in exactly the same manner as for the
case n = 1 treated above.
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3 One period transition to a cyclical equilibrium
All cyclical AJ-equilibrium allocations described in Proposition 5.3 in the main text
(where agents cannot borrow after default) can be achieved with zero initial wealth by
the agents. In contrast, each non-autarchic cyclical equilibrium described in Propo-
sition 5.1 in the paper (where agents cannot trade after default) requires specific
non-zero initial wealth for the agents. However, we show here that all such cyclical
equilibrium paths can be reached after a one period transition, when all agents start
with zero wealth. With zero initial wealth, there exists an equilibrium in which the
transfers from the high-type to low-type agents are constant after the first period and
an infinite number of equilibria converging to autarchy. Therefore the endogeneity
of debt limits causes multiplicity of not only asset prices (through bubbles), but also
of real equilibrium allocations, for both types of punishment for default.
For the rest of this section we assume that the penalty for default is the interdic-
tion to trade. We add an extra period and assume that time starts at −1 and that,
in agreement with our convention, the even agent has low endowment at −1 while
the odd agent has high endowment at −1. We investigate the equilibria where the
high-type agent at period −1 (the odd agent) is a saver, transferring an amount x−1
to the the low-type at period −1, and the transfers (xt) from high-type to low type
agents for periods greater or equal to zero (and consumption, asset holdings, debt
limits and bond prices) are described in Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 3.1. Let
(
(pt), (c
i
t), (a
i
t), (φ
i
t), (V
i,d
t )
)
t≥0
be a cyclical non-autarchic AJ-
equilibrium associated to a sequence of transfers (xt)t≥0, as in Proposition 5.1 (in
the main text). Let η := min{x¯−1, yH − yL − x0}, where x¯−1 is chosen such that
f(x¯−1, x0) = 0 (see (5.8) in the paper). Let x−1 ∈ [0, η]. Then (xt)t≥−1 are transfers
from high-type to low-type agents in an AJ-equilibrium
(
(pt), (c
i
t), (a
i
t), (φ
i
t), (V
i,d
t )
)
t≥−1
with initial wealth levels ai−1 for the agents, where
2
p−1 :=
u′(yH − x−1)
βu′(yL + x0)
, ao−1 = a
o
0/p−1 − x−1, ae−1 = ae−1 := −ao−1.
2The outside option at period −1 is autarchy, that is V i,d−1 :=
∑
t≥−1 β
tu(eit), and φ
i
−1 is chosen
to be NTT, that is V i−1(φ
i
−1, (φ
i
t)t≥0, (pt)t≥−1) = V
i,d
−1 .
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The initial wealth ae−1 of the even agent is strictly increasing in x−1, and a
e
−1 < 0 for
x−1 = 0 and ae−1 > 0 for x−1 = η.
Proof. The first order condition of the high-type (odd) agent at −1 are satisfied, by
the construction of p−1. By (5.5) (in the paper), the first order condition for the low-
type (even) agent at −1 is satisfied since x−1 +x0 ≤ yH−yL−x0 +x0 ≤ yH−yL. The
participation constraint at −1 of the even agent is satisfied, since x−1 ≥ 0, therefore
he receives a positive transfer at −1 and at 0 his continuation utility is equal to that
provided by autarchy. The participation constraint at −1 if the odd agent is also
satisfied, since f(x−1, x0) ≤ f(x¯−1, x0) = 0. Agents’ budget constraints at −1 hold
by construction, and their transversality conditions hold, being the same as in the
equilibrium starting at 0.
Finally, ae−1 = x−1−ao0/p−1 and is therefore strictly increasing in x−1, since p−1 is
strictly decreasing in x−1 and ao0 > 0. Indeed, by (5.12) (in the paper), the sequence
(ptxt)t≥0 is strictly decreasing, and therefore
ao0 ≥ L1 := lim
t→∞
2t−1∑
s=0
(−1)spsxs > p0x0 − p1x1 > 0.
If x−1 = 0, then clearly
ae−1 = −ao0
βu′(yL + x0)
u′(yH)
< 0.
Assume now that x−1 = η. If x¯−1 ≤ yH−yL−x0, then x−1 = x¯−1 and f(x−1, x0) =
0. It follows that
u′(yH − x−1)x−1 > u(yH)− u(yH − x−1) = β
(
u(yL + x0)− u(yL)
)
> βu′(yL + x0)x0,
and thus p−1 > x0/x−1. Therefore
ae−1 =
p−1x−1 − ao0
p−1
>
p−1x−1 − x0
p−1
> 0,
since
ao0 ≤ L2 := lim
t→∞
2t∑
s=0
(−1)spsxs < p0x0 = x0.
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If x¯−1 > yH − yL − x0, then x−1 = yH − yL − x0. Hence p−1 = 1/β, and
ae−1 = y
H − yL − x0 − βao0 > yH − yL − x0 − βx0 > yH − yL − (1 + β)
yH − yL
2
> 0,
where we used the inequality x0 ≤ (yH − yL)/2.
Proposition 3.1 implies that all the cyclical equilibrium paths described in Propo-
sition 5.1 in the main text (including the autarchic one) can be achieved after a one
period transition if agents start with zero wealth.
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